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Abstract
We study two important concepts in adversarial deep
learning—adversarial training and generative adversarial
network (GAN). Adversarial training is the technique used
to improve the robustness of discriminator by combining ad-
versarial attacker and discriminator in the training phase.
GAN is commonly used for image generation by jointly
optimizing discriminator and generator. We show these
two concepts are indeed closely related and can be used
to strengthen each other—adding a generator to the ad-
versarial training procedure can improve the robustness of
discriminators, and adding an adversarial attack to GAN
training can improve the convergence speed and lead to bet-
ter generators. Combining these two insights, we develop
a framework called Rob-GAN to jointly optimize generator
and discriminator in the presence of adversarial attacks—
the generator generates fake images to fool discriminator;
the adversarial attacker perturbs real images to fool discrim-
inator, and the discriminator wants to minimize loss under
fake and adversarial images. Through this end-to-end train-
ing procedure, we are able to simultaneously improve the
convergence speed of GAN training, the quality of synthetic
images, and the robustness of discriminator under strong
adversarial attacks. Experimental results demonstrate that
the obtained classifier is more robust than state-of-the-art
adversarial training approach [23], and the generator out-
performs SN-GAN on ImageNet-143.
1. Introduction
Adversarial deep learning has received a significant
amount of attention in the last few years. In this paper,
we study two important but different concepts—adversarial
attack/defense and generative adversarial network (GAN).
Adversarial attacks are algorithms that find a highly resem-
bled images to cheat a classifier. Training classifiers under
adversarial attack (also known as adversarial training) has
become one of the most promising ways to improve the
robustness of classifiers [23]. On the other hand, GAN is
∗Project repository: https://github.com/xuanqing94/RobGAN
Figure 1: Illustration of the training process. This is similar
to the standard GAN training, i.e. alternatively updating
the generator G and discriminator D networks. The main
difference is that whenever feeding the real images to the D
network, we first invoke adversarial attack, so the discrimi-
nator is trained with adversarial examples.
a generative model where the generator learns to convert
white noise to images that look authentic to the discrimi-
nator [11, 28]. We show in this paper that they are indeed
closely related and can be used to strengthen each other,
specifically we have the following key insights:
1. The robustness of adversarial trained classifier can be
improved if we have a deeper understanding of the
image distribution. Therefore a generator can improve
the adversarial training process.
2. GAN training can be very slow to reach the equilibrium
if the discriminator has a large curvature on the image
manifold. Therefore an adversarial trained discrimina-
tor can accelerate GAN training.
Based on these findings, we managed to accelerate and stabi-
lize the GAN training cycle, by enforcing the discriminator
to stay robust on image manifold. At the same time, since
data augmentation is used in the robust training process,
the generator provides more information about the data dis-
tribution. Therefore we get a more robust classifier that
generalizes better to unseen data. Our contributions can be
summarized as follows:
1. We give insights why the current adversarial training
algorithm does not generalize well to unseen data. Par-
allelly, we explain why the GAN training is slow to
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reach an equilibrium.
2. We draw a connection between adversarial training and
GAN training, showing how they can benefit each other:
we can use GAN to improve the generalizability of ad-
versarial training, and use adversarial training to accel-
erate GAN training and meanwhile make it converge to
a better generator.
3. We propose a novel framework called Rob-GAN,
which integrates generator, discriminator and adver-
sarial attacker as a three-player game. And we also
show how to train the framework efficiently in an end
to end manner.
4. We formulate a better training loss for conditional GAN
by reformulating the AC-GAN loss.
5. We design a series of experiments to confirm all the hy-
potheses and innovations made in the text. For example,
with GAN data augmentation, we can improve the accu-
racy of state-of-the-art adversarial training method [23]
from 29.6% to 36.4% on ResNet18(+CIFAR10) under
a strong adversarial attack. Moreover, we observe a
3 ∼ 7x speedup in terms of convergence rate, when
inserting the adversarial attacker into GAN training cy-
cle. Lastly, our model attains better inception scores
on both datasets, compared with the strong baseline
(SN-GAN [26]).
Notations Throughout this paper, we denote the (image,
label) pair as (xi, yi), i is the index of data point; The clas-
sifier parameterized by weights w is f(x;w), this function
includes the final Softmax layer so the output is probabili-
ties. Loss function is denoted as `(·, ·). We also define D(x)
andG(z) as the discriminator and generator networks respec-
tively. The adversarial example xadv is crafted by perturbing
the original input, i.e. xadv = x + δ, where ‖δ‖ ≤ δmax.
For convenience, we consider `∞-norm in our experiments.
The real and fake images are denoted as xreal/fake. Note that
in this paper “fake” images and “adversarial” images are
different: fake images are generated by generator, while ad-
versarial images are made by perturbing the natural images
with small (carefully designed) noise. The training set is
denoted as Dtr, with Ntr data points. This is also the em-
pirical distribution. The unknown data distribution is Pdata.
Given the training set Dtr, we define empirical loss function
1
Ntr
∑Ntr
i=1 `(f(xi;w), yi) = E(x,y)∼Dtr `(f(x;w), y).
2. Background and Related Work
2.1. Generative Adaversarial Network
A GAN has two competing networks with different ob-
jectives: in the training phase, the generator G(z) and the
discriminator D(x) are evolved in a minimax game, which
can be denoted as a unified loss:
min
G
max
D
{
E
x∼Dtr
[
logD(x)
]
+ E
z∼Pz
[
log(1−D(G(z))]},
(1)
where Pz is the distribution of noise. Unlike traditional
machine learning problems where we typically minimize
the loss, (1) is harder to optimize and that is the focus of
recent literature. Among them, a guideline for the architec-
tures of G and D is summarized in [30]. For high resolution
and photo-realistic image generation, currently the standard
way is to first learn to generate low resolution images as
the intermediate products, and then learn to refine them pro-
gressively [9, 20]. This turns out to be more stable than
directly generating high resolution images through a gigan-
tic network. To reach the equilibrium efficiently, alternative
loss functions [1, 2, 5, 13, 37] are applied and proven to
be effective. Among them, [1] theoretically explains why
training DCGAN is highly unstable. Following that work,
[2] proposes to use Wasserstein-1 distance to measure the
distance between real and fake data distribution. The result-
ing network, namely “Wasserstein-GAN”, largely improves
the stability of GAN training. Another noteworthy work in-
spired by WGAN/WGAN-GP is spectral normalization [26].
The main idea is to estimate the operator norm σmax(W ) of
weights W inside layers (convolution, linear, etc.), and then
normalize these weights to have 1-operator norm. Because
ReLU non-linearity is 1-Lipschitz, if we stack these layers
together the whole network will still be 1-Lipschitz, which
is exactly the prerequisite to apply Kantorovich-Rubinstein
duality to estimate Wasserstein distance.
2.2. Adversarial attacks and defenses
Another key ingredient of our method is adversarial train-
ing, originated in [35] and further studied in [12]. They
found that machine learning models can be easily “fooled”
by slightly modified images if we design a tiny perturbation
according to some “attack” algorithms. In this paper we ap-
ply a standard algorithm called PGD-attack [23] to generate
adversarial examples. Given an example x with ground truth
label y, PGD computes adversarial perturbation δ by solving
the following optimization with Projected Gradient Descent:
δ := argmax
‖δ‖≤δmax
`
(
f(x+ δ;w), y
)
, (2)
where f(·;w) is the network parameterized by weights w,
`(·, ·) is the loss function and for convenience we choose
‖ · ‖ to be the `∞-norm in accordance with [23, 4], but note
that other norms are also applicable. Intuitively, the idea
of (2) is to find the point xadv := x + δ within an `∞-ball
such that the loss value of xadv is maximized, so that point
is most likely to be an adversarial example. In fact, most
optimization-based attacking algorithms (e.g. FGSM [12],
C&W [7]) share the same idea as PGD attack.
Opposite to the adversarial attacks, the adversarial de-
fenses are techniques that make models resistant to ad-
versarial examples. It is worth noting that defense is a
much harder task compared with attacks, especially for
high dimensional data combined with complex models.
Despite that huge amount of defense methods are pro-
posed [29, 23, 6, 22, 15, 10, 39, 34, 31], which can be iden-
tified as either random based, projection based, or de-noiser
based. In the important overview paper [4, 3], adversarial
training [23] is acknowledged as one of the most powerful
defense algorithm, which can be formulated as
min
w
E
(x,y)∼Pdata
[
max
‖δ‖≤δmax
`
(
f(x+ δ;w), y
)]
, (3)
where (x, y) ∼ Pdata is the (image, label) joint distribu-
tion of data, f(x;w) is the network parameterized by w,
`
(
f(x;w), y
)
is the loss function of network (such as the
cross-entropy loss). We remark that the ground truth data
distribution Pdata is not known in practice, which will be
replaced by the empirical distribution.
It is worth noting that one of our contributions is to use
GAN to defend the adversarial attacks, which is superficially
similar to Defense-GAN [32]. However, they are totally
different underneath: the idea of Defense-GAN is to project
an adversarial example to the space of fake images by min-
imizing `2 distance: xout = argminG(z) ‖xadv − G(z)‖2,
and then making prediction on the output xout. In contrast,
our defense mechanism is largely based on adversarial train-
ing [23]. Another less related work that applies GAN in
adversarial setting is AdvGAN [38], where GAN is used to
generate adversarial examples. In comparison, we design a
collaboration scheme between GAN and adversarial training
and both parts are trained jointly.
3. Proposed Approach
We propose a framework called Rob-GAN to jointly op-
timize generator and discriminator in the presence of adver-
sarial attacks—the generator generates fake images to fool
discriminator; the adversarial attack perturbs real images to
fool discriminator, and the discriminator wants to minimize
loss under fake and adversarial images (see Fig. 1). In fact,
Rob-GAN is closely related to both adversarial training and
GAN. If we remove generator, Rob-GAN becomes standard
adversarial training method. If we remove adversarial attack,
Rob-GAN becomes standard GAN. But why do we want to
put these three components together? Before delving into
details, we first present two important motivations: I) Why
can GAN improve the robustness of adversarial trained dis-
criminator? II) Why can adversarial attacker improve the
training of GAN?
We answer I) and II) in Section 3.1 and 3.2, and then give
details of Rob-GAN in Section 3.3.
3.1. Insight I: The generalization gap of adversarial
training — GAN aided adversarial training
In Sec. 2.2 we listed some works on adversarial defense,
and pointed out that adversarial training is one of the most
effective defense method to date. However, until now this
method has only been tested on small dataset like MNIST
and CIFAR10 and it is still an open problem whether adver-
sarial training can scale to large dataset such as ImageNet.
Furthermore, although adversarial training leads to certified
robustness on training set (due to the design of the objective
function (3)), the performance usually drops significantly on
the test set. This means that the generalization gap is large
under adversarial attacks (Fig. 2 (Left)). In other words, de-
spite that it is hard to find an adversarial example near the
training data, it is much easier to find one near the testing
data. In the following, we investigate the reason behind this
huge (and enlarging) generalization gap, and later we will
solve this problem with GAN aided adversarial training.
To make our model robust to adversarial distortion, it is
desirable to enforce a small local Lipschitz value (LLV) on
the underlining data distribution Pdata. This idea includes
many of the defense methods such as [8]. In essence, re-
stricting the LLV can be formulated as a composite loss
minimization problem:
min
w
E
(x,y)∼Pdata
[
`
(
f(x;w), y
)
+ λ · ∥∥ ∂
∂x
`
(
f(x;w), y
)∥∥
2
]
.
(4)
Note that (4) can be regarded as the “linear expansion” of (3).
In practice we do not know the ground truth data distribution
Pdata; instead, we use the empirical distribution to replace
(4):
min
w
1
Ntr
Ntr∑
i=1
[
`
(
f(xi;w), yi
)
+λ·∥∥ ∂
∂xi
`
(
f(xi;w), yi
)∥∥
2
]
,
(5)
where {(xi, yi)}Ntri=1 are feature-label pairs of the training
set. Ideally, if we have enough data and the hypotheses
set is moderately large, the objective function in (5) still
converges to (4). However when considering adversarial
robustness, we have one more problem to worry about:
Does small LLV in training set automatically gen-
eralize to test set?
The enlarged accuracy gap shown in Fig. 2 (Left) implies
a negative answer. To verify this phenomenon in an ex-
plicit way, we calculate Lipschitz values on samples from
training and testing set separately (Fig. 2 (Right)). We can
see that similar to the accuracy gap, the LLV gap between
training and testing set is equally large. Thus we conclude
that although adversarial training controls LLV around
training set effectively, this property does not generalize
to test set. Notice that our empirical findings do not con-
tradict the certified robustness of adversarial training using
generalization theory (e.g. [33]), which can be loose when
dealing with deep neural networks.
The generalization gap can be reduced if we have a direct
access to the whole distribution Pdata, instead of approxi-
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Figure 2: Left: Accuracy under different levels of attack. The model (VGG16) is obtained by adversarial training on CIFAR-10
with the maximum perturbation in adversarial training set as 8/256. We can observe that: 1) the accuracy gap between training
and testing is large, 2) the gap is even larger than the attack strength (after attack strength ≈ 0.03, both training and testing
accuracy go down to zero, so the gap also decreases). Right: The local Lipschitz value (LLV) measured by gradient norm
‖ ∂∂xi `
(
f(xi;w), yi
)‖2. Data pairs (xi, yi) are sampled from the training and testing set respectively. During the training
process, LLV on the training set stabilizes at a low level, while LLV on the test set keeps growing.
mating it by limited training data. This leads to our first
motivation:
Can we use GAN to learn Pdata and then perform
the adversarial training process on the learned
distribution?
If so, then it becomes straightforward to train an even more
robust classifier. Here we give the loss function for doing
that, which can be regarded as composite robust optimization
on both original training data and GAN synthesized data:
min
w
Lreal(w, δmax) + λ · Lfake(w, δmax),
Lreal(w, δmax) , 1
Ntr
Ntr∑
i=1
max
‖δi‖≤δmax
`
(
f(xi + δi;w); yi
)
,
Lfake(w, δmax) , E
(x,y)∼Pfake
max
‖δ‖≤δmax
`
(
f(x+ δ;w); y
)
.
(6)
Again the coefficient λ is used to balance the two losses.
To optimize the objective function (6), we adopt the same
stochastic optimization algorithm as adversarial training.
That is, at each iteration we draw samples from either train-
ing or synthesized data, find the adversarial examples, and
then calculate stochastic gradients upon the adversarial ex-
amples. We will show the experimental results in Sec. 4.
3.2. Insight II: Accelerate GAN training by robust
discriminator
If even a well trained deep classifier can be easily
“cheated” by adversarial examples, so can the others. Recall
in conditional GANs, such as AC-GAN [28], the discrim-
inator should not only classify real/fake images but also
assign correct labels to input images. Chances are that, if
the discriminator is not robust enough to the adversarial at-
tacks, then the generator could make use of its weakness
and “cheat” the discriminator in a similar way. Furthermore,
even though the discriminator can be trained to recognize
certain adversarial patterns, the generator will find out other
adversarial patterns easily, so the minimax game never stops.
Thus we make the following hypothesis:
Fast GAN training relies on robust discriminator.
Before we support this hypothesis with experiments, we
briefly review the development of GANs: the first version
of GAN objective [11] is unstable to train, WGAN [2, 14]
adds a gradient regularizer to enforce the discriminator to
be globally 1-Lipschitz continuous. Later on, SN-GAN [26]
improves WGAN by replacing gradient regularizer with spec-
tral normalization, again enforcing 1-Lipschitz continuity
globally in discriminator. We see both methods implicitly
make discriminator to be robust against adversarial attacks,
because a small Lipschitz value (e.g. 1-Lipschitz) enables
stronger invariance to adversarial perturbations.
Despite the success along this line of research, we wonder
if a weaker but smarter regularization to the discriminator is
possible. After all, if the regularization effect is too strong,
then the model expressiveness will be restricted. Concretely,
instead of a strict one-Lipschitz function globally, we re-
quire a small local Lipschitz value on image manifold. As
we will see, this can be done conveniently through adversar-
ial training to the discriminator. In this way, we can draw a
connection between the robustness of discriminator and the
learning efficiency of generator, as illustrated in Fig. 3.
As one can see in Fig. 3, if a discriminatorD(x) has small
LLV (equivalently, small ‖D′(x)‖), then we know D(x +
δ) ≈ D(x) + D′(x) · δ ≈ D(x) for a “reasonably” small
δ. In other words, for a robust discriminator, the perturbed
fake image xadv = x0 + δ is unlikely to be misclassified as
real image, unless δ is large. Different from the setting of
adversarial attacks (2), in GAN training, the “attacker” is
now a generator network G(z;w) parameterized by w ∈ Rd.
Suppose at time t, the discriminator can successfully identify
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Figure 3: Comparing robust and non-robust discriminators,
for simplicity, we put them together into one graph. Concep-
tually, the non-robust discriminator tends to make all images
close to the decision boundary, so even a tiny distortion δ can
move a fake image x0 to across the decision boundary and
leads to a mis-classification: xadv = x0+δ. In contrast, such
δ is expected to be much larger for robust discriminators.
fake images, or equivalently D(G(z;wt)) ≈ 0 for all z,
then at time t + 1 what should the generator do to make
D(G(z;wt+1)) ≈ 1? We can develop the following bound
by assuming the Lipschitz continuity of D(x) and G(z;w),
1 ≈D(G(z;wt+1))−D(G(z;wt))
/‖D′(G(z;wt))‖ · ‖G(z;wt+1)−G(z;wt)‖
/‖D′(G(z;wt))‖ · ‖ ∂
∂w
G(z;wt)‖ · ‖wt+1 − wt‖
≤LDLG‖wt+1 − wt‖,
(7)
where LD,G indicates the Lipschitz constants of discrim-
inator and generator. As we can see, the update of gen-
erator weights is inversely proportional to LD and LG:
‖wt+1−wt‖ ∝ 1LDLG . If the discriminator is lacking robust-
ness, meaning LD is large, then the generator only needs to
make a small movement from the previous weights wt, mak-
ing the convergence very slow. This validates our hypothesis
that fast GAN training relies on robust discriminator. In
the experiment section, we observe the same phenomenon
in all two experiments, providing a solid support for this
hypothesis.
3.3. Rob-GAN: Adversarial training on learned im-
age manifold
Motivated by Sec. 3.1 and 3.2, we propose a system that
combines generator, discriminator, and adversarial attacker
into a single framework. Within this framework, we conduct
end-to-end training for both generator and discriminator: the
generator feeds fake images to the discriminator; meanwhile
real images sampled from training set are preprocessed by
PGD attacking algorithm before sending to the discriminator.
The network structure is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Discriminator and the new loss function: The discrimi-
nator could have the standard architecture like AC-GAN. At
each iteration, it discriminates real and fake images. When
the ground truth labels are available, it also predicts the
classes. In this paper, we only consider the conditional
GANs proposed in [25, 28, 27], and their architectural dif-
ferences are illustrated in Fig. 4. Among them we sim-
ply choose AC-GAN, despite that SN-GAN (a combination
of spectral normalization [26] and projection discrimina-
tor [27]) performs much better in their paper. The reason
we choose AC-GAN is that SN-GAN’s discriminator relies
on the ground truth labels and their objective function is not
designed to encourage high classification accuracy. But sur-
prisingly, even though AC-GAN is beaten by SN-GAN by a
large margin, after inserting the adversarial training module,
the performance of AC-GAN matches or even surpasses the
SN-GAN, due to the reason discussed in Sec. 3.2.
We also improved the loss function of AC-GAN. Recall
that the original loss in [28] defined by discrimination likeli-
hood LS and classification likelihood LC :
LS = E[logP(S = real|Xreal)] + E[logP(S = fake|Xfake)]
LC = E[logP(C = c|Xreal)] + E[logP(C = c|Xfake)],
(8)
where Xreal/fake are any real/fake images, S is the discrim-
inator output, and C is the classifier output. Based on (8),
the goal of discriminator is to maximize LS + LC while
generator aims at maximizing LC − LS . According to this
formula, both G and D are trained to increase LC , which
is problematic because even if G(z;w) generates bad im-
ages, D(x) has to struggle to classify them (with high loss),
and in such case the corresponding gradient term∇LC can
contribute uninformative direction to the discriminator. To
resolve this issue, we split LC to separate the contributions
of real and fake images,
LC1 = E[logP(C = c|Xreal)]
LC2 = E[logP(C = c|Xfake)],
(9)
then discriminator maximizes LS +LC1 and generator max-
imizes LC2 − LS . The new objective function ensures that
discriminator only focuses on classifying real images and
discriminating real/fake images, and the classifier branch
will not be distracted by the fake images.
Generator: Similar to the traditional GAN training, the
generator is updated on a regular basis to mimic the distribu-
tion of real data. This is the key ingredient to improve the
robustness of classification task: as shown in Sec. 3.1, model
from adversarial training performs well on training set but
is vulnerable on test set. Intuitively, this is because during
adversarial training, the network only “sees” adversarial ex-
amples residing in the small region of all training samples,
whereas the rest images in the data manifold are undefended.
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Figure 4: Comparing the architectures of discriminators. Our architecture is similar to AC-GAN [28], but they are different in
loss functions, if one compares (8) with (9). (x, y) is (image, label) pair, φ and ψ denote different network blocks. Recall in
AC-GAN and our architecture, the discriminator has two branches, one is for discriminating “real/fake” images and the other
is for classification.
Data augmentation is a natural way to resolve this issue, but
traditional data augmentation methods like image jittering,
random resizing, rotation, etc. [21, 16, 36, 40, 18] are all
simple geometric transforms, they are useful but not effec-
tive enough: even after random transforms, the total number
of training data is still much fewer than required. Instead,
our system has unlimited samples from generator to provide
a continuously supported probability density function for
the adversarial training. Unlike traditional augmentation
methods, if the equilibrium in (1) is reached, then we can
show that the solution of (1) would be Pfake(z) dist.= Preal [11],
and therefore the classifier can be trained on the ground truth
distribution Preal.
Figure 5: Illustration of fine-tuning the discriminator. We
omit the adversarial attack here for brevity.
Fine-tuning the classifier: After end-to-end training, the
discriminator has learned to minimize both discrimination
loss and classification loss (see Fig. 1). If we want to train
the discriminator to conduct a pure multi-class classification
task, we will need to fine-tune it by combining fake and real
images and conducting several steps of SGD only on the
robustness classification loss (illustrated in Fig. 5):
LclsD , E
(x,y)∼Preal
`(f(xadv;w), y)+
λ · E
(x,y)∼Pfake
`(f(xadv;w), y),
(10)
where xadv = argmin‖x′−x‖≤δmax `(f(x
′;w), y). Here the
function f(x;w) is just the classifier branch of discriminator
D(x), recalling that we are dealing with conditional GAN.
As we can see, throughout the fine-tuning stage, we force the
discriminator to focus on the classification task rather than
the discrimination task. The experiments will show that the
fine-tuning step improves the accuracy by a large margin.
4. Experimental Results
We experiment on both CIFAR10 and a subset of Im-
ageNet data. Specifically, we extract classes yi such that
yi ∈ np.arange(151, 294, 1) from the original Im-
ageNet data: recall in total there are 1000 classes in Im-
ageNet data and we sampled 294 − 151 = 143 classes
from them. We choose these datasets because 1) the cur-
rent state-of-the-art GAN, SN-GAN [27], also worked on
these datasets, and 2) the current state-of-the-art adversarial
training method [23] cannot scale to ImageNet-1k data. In
order to have a fair comparison, we copy all the network ar-
chitectures of generators and discriminators from SN-GAN.
Other important factors, such as learning rate, optimization
algorithms, and number of discriminator updates in each
cycle are also kept the same. The only modification is that
we discarded the feature projection layer and applied the
auxiliary classifier (see Fig. 4).
4.1. Quality of Discriminator
We show that Rob-GAN leads to more robust discrimina-
tor than state-of-the-art adversarial trained models.
Effect of fine-tuning. We first compare Rob-GAN
with/without fine-tuning to verify our claim in Sec. 3.3 that
fine-tuning improves classification accuracy. To this end, we
compare two sets of models: in the first set, we directly ex-
tract the auxiliary classifiers from discriminators to classify
images; in the second set, we apply fine-tuning strategy to
the pretrained model as Fig. 5 illustrated. The results are in
Fig. 6 (left), which suggests that fine-tuning is useful.
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Figure 6: Left two panels: The effect of fine-tuning on prediction accuracy (left: CIFAR10, middle: ImageNet-64px). Right
panel: Comparing the accuracy gap between adversarial training model and GAN data augmentation model.
Accuracy gap comparison: with or without data aug-
mentation. We check whether adversarial training with
fake data augmentation (6) really shrinks the generalization
gap. To this end, we draw the same figure as Fig. 2, except
that now the classification model is the discriminator of Rob-
GAN with fine tuning. We compare the accuracy gap in
Fig. 6 (Right). Clearly the model trained with the adversar-
ial real+fake augmentation strategy works extremely well:
it improves the testing accuracy under PGD-attack and so
the generalization gap between training/testing set does not
increase that much.
Dataset Defense δmax of `∞ attacks
0 0.02 0.04 0.08
CIFAR10 Adv. training 81.45% 69.15% 53.74% 23.58%
Rob-GAN (w/ FT) 81.1% 70.41% 57.43% 30.25%
0 0.01 0.02 0.03
ImageNet†
(64px)
Adv. Training 20.05% 18.3% 12.52% 8.32%
Rob-GAN (w/ FT) 32.4% 25.2% 19.1% 13.7%
†Denotes the 143-class subset of ImageNet.
Table 1: Accuracy of our model under `∞ PGD-attack. “FT”
means fine-tuning.
Robustness of discriminator: comparing robustness
with/ without data augmentation. In this experiment, we
compare the robustness of discriminators trained by Rob-
GAN with the state-of-the-art adversarial training algorithm
by [23]. As shown in a recent comparison [4], adversarial
training [23] achieve state-of-the-art performance in terms
of robustness under adversarial attacks. Since adversarial
training is equivalent to Rob-GAN without the GAN compo-
nent, for fair comparison we keep all the other components
(network structures) the same.
To test the robustness of different models, we choose the
widely used `∞ PGD attack [23], but other gradient based
attacks are expected to yield the same results. We set the `∞
perturbation to δmax ∈ np.arange(0, 0.1, 0.01)
as defined in (2). Another minor detail is that we scale the
images to [−1, 1] rather than usual [0, 1]. This is because
generators always have a tanh() output layer, so we need to
do some adaptations accordingly. We present the results in
Tab. 1, which clearly shows that our method (Rob-GAN w/
FT) performs better than state-of-the-art defense algorithm.
4.2. Quality of Generator
Next we show that by introducing adversarial attack in
GAN training, Rob-GAN improves the convergence of the
generator.
Effect of split classification loss. Here we show the ef-
fect of split classification loss described in (9). Recall that
if we apply the loss in (8) then the resulting model is AC-
GAN. It is known that AC-GAN can easily lose modes in
practice, i.e. the generator simply ignores the noise input
z and produces fixed images according to the label y. This
defect is observed in many previous works [17, 24, 19]. In
this ablation experiment, we compare the generated images
trained by two loss functions in Fig. 7. Clearly the proposed
new loss outperforms the AC-GAN loss.
Quality of generator and convergence speed. Finally,
we evaluate the quality of generators trained on two datasets:
ImageNet subset - 64px and ImageNet subset - 128px. We
compare with the generator obtained by SN-GAN, which
has been recognized as a state-of-the-art conditional-GAN
model for learning hundreds of classes. Note that SN-GAN
can also learn the conditional distribution of the entire Ima-
geNet data (1000 classes), unfortunately, we are not able to
match this experiment due to time and hardware limit. To
show the performance with/without adversarial training and
with/without new loss, we report the performance of all the
four combinations in Figure 8. Note that “original loss” is
equivalent to AC-GAN. Based on Figure 8 we can make the
following three observations. First, adversarial training can
improve the convergence speed of GAN training and make it
converge to a better solution. Second, the new loss leads to
better solutions on both datasets. Finally, the proposed Rob-
GAN outperforms SN-GAN (in terms of inception score) on
these two datasets.
Figure 7: Comparing the generated images trained by our modified loss(left) with the original AC-GAN loss(right). For fair
comparison, both networks are trained by inserting adversarial attacker (Sec. 3.2). We can see images from AC-GAN loss are
more distorted and harder to distinguish.
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Figure 8: Results on subset of ImageNet, left: 64px, right: 128px. Here we tried four combinations in total: with or without
adversarial training, new loss or original loss. We have three findings: 1) Compared with SN-GAN, our model (new loss +
adversarial) learns a high quality generator efficiently: in both datasets, our model surpasses SN-GAN in just 25 epochs (64px)
or 50 epochs (128px). 2) When comparing the new loss with the original loss, we see the new loss performs better. 3) Using
the new loss, the adversarial training algorithm has a great acceleration effect.
5. Conclusions
We show the generator can improve adversarial train-
ing, and the adversarial attacker can improve GAN training.
Based on these two insights, we proposed to combine gen-
erator, discriminator and adversarial attacker in the same
system and conduct end-to-end training. The proposed sys-
tem simultaneously leads to a better generator and a more
robust discriminator compared with state-of-the-art models.
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